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lN 1"HE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
D. PAUL FERGUSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JEFFREY PAUL JONGSMA, 
J. JACOB JONGSMA, VAUGHN 
WILLIAM KAY and ALBERT KAY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 8897 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT O·F FACTS 
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in favor of the 
defendant Jeffrey Paul Jongsma, J. Jacob Jongsma and 
Vaughn William Kay and against the plaintiff and from 
the court's subsequent order denying the plaintiff's mo-
tion for a new trial. The action as to the defendant Albert 
Kay was dismissed by proper motion at the close of plain-
tiff's case and without objection (R. 200). As indicated 
in the appellant's brief there was a sharp conflict in the 
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2 
evidence. In order that the case might be fully under-
stood we make our own statement of facts. 
This action arose out of an accident that occurred at 
about 11:30 P.M. on August 30, 1957, at 2531 East 4800 
South, Salt Lake County, State of Utah (R. 1, 16, 17). 4800 
South is a paved road running east and west. The plain-
tiff's home was on the north side of said road and the 
Broadhead home on the south side opposite the plaintiff's 
home (Ex. P-1). The plaintiff testified the traveled 
portion of the road was 24 feet wide (R. 31, 32, 66). 
The Broadhead truck was par ked on the south side of 
4800 South in front of the Broadhead home headed east 
(R.18,Ex.P-1). 
The defendant Vaughn Kay had been driving a 1946 
Ford registered in his father's name, with the defendant 
Jeffrey Jongsma as a passenger. Kay and Jongsma were 
merely riding around (R 120) and proceeded east up 4800 
South Street, at which time they observed the parked 
Broadhead truck (R. 121). Being low on gas, Kay decided 
to siphon some from the truck (R 121). He parked the 
car, with its lights off, headed west on the north 
side of the street with its front end about even with 
the back of the cab of the Broadhead truck (R. 121, 122, 
204-20 5). Kay went over to the truck and as he did so, 
Jongsma slid over into the driver's seat. Kay was attempt-
ing to knock the cap off when the plaintiff came out 
(R. 122, 123). 
The plaintiff had been a deputy sheriff of Salt Lake 
County, but had resigned in February of 1957 to take 
up employment with the Skyline Oil Company. He 
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terminated this employment on the 3Oth of August and 
had made arrangements to resume work at the Sherif£' s 
Office on September 1, 1957. He was not employed as 
a deputy sheriff at the time of the accident (R. 63-64). 
He was not in uniform and did not at any time tell either 
Jongsma or Kay that he was an officer or claimed to be 
an officer (R. 152-153). 
Prior to going out to the street, plaintiff obtained a 
large face three-cell flash light and a .3 8 5 -inch barrel 
revolver from a drawer in his home (R. 25). He took the 
revolver for psychological reasons and, because if you 
didn't have a gun, you could not make people stop rrunless 
you can overtake them and beat them into submission" 
(R. 25-26). Although he made sure the gun was unloaded 
R. 26-27), he readily admitted that neither Jongsma nor 
Kay knew that it was unloaded, and he intended them to 
think it was loaded (R. 73). He wanted to frighten the 
boys. He actually threatened to shoot Jongsma (R. 74, 
8 5) . He had the gun in one hand and the flash light in the 
other (R. 27). He walked out to the middle of 4800 
South about 12 feet on a straight line and 20 feet on 
a diagonal line from the front of the Kay car (R. 67, 68-
69) . While standing in this position he observed the car 
start to move forward (R. 69, 70). It continued straight 
west maybe 3, 5, or 10 feet, during all of which titne (<it 
was traveling very slowly" at a speed of one or two 
miles per hour. The car thereafter suddenly turned 
rather sharply to the left towards him. It was then only 
traveling one or two miles per hour and started to aced-
erate. The plaintiff continued in the same spot where he 
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had been. In fact, he never moved thereform (R. 32, 33, 
69, and 71), despite the fact that he knew the car was 
headed directly toward him (R. 3 3). He was aware of 
the motion of the car from the time it first started until 
the time of the accident (R. 34, 70-71) and was confi-
dent of what he was doing. The thought did not occur to 
him to move from its path because ((I knew what I was 
doing, and I knew how to handle the situation*::-*." 
((Q. Well, you felt it was perfectly safe to 
remain right in the path of an automobile 
that was turning toward you and starting to 
accelerate rapidly? 
A. That is right. 
Q. And as I understand you, you continued to 
stand right in that position until the automobile 
got within maybe four or five feet of you? 
A. Right. 
Q. All the time you say it was rapidly acceler-
ating? 
A. That is right. 
Q. And then you just took one step away so 
that the front end of that car just barely missed 
you, according to your testimony? 
A. It missed me. 
Q. And I believe you also testified if you had 
desired to you could have 1noved completely out 
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of the path of the car, or even the door of the car, 
could you not? 
A. I could have missed the car completely. I 
1nerely stepped. I could have run up to th~_truck, 
and I would have been safe. -- -
Q. As the car was coming towards you you 
could have taken a couple of steps out of its path 
and you would have been out of its way of you? 
A. That is right. 
Q. But you didn't see fit to do that? 
A. There was no reason to." (R. 72-73). 
He testified that as the front end of the car passed 
him, the left door was then thrown open. The impact 
did not jar either the flash light or the gun out of his 
hands. He had no idea as to the speed of the car at the 
moment of the impact (R. 74-77). Later on he testified 
it was probably around 10 or 1 5 miles per hour, but could 
have been less (R. 83). He hung onto the car, still hol~­
ing the gun in one hand and the flash light in the other, 
with his arms extending through the open window of the 
left door ( R. 77) . 
He admitted that he could have gone after the boy 
on foot, but thought it was easier to go after the boy in the 
car. He admitted that he could easily have got the license 
number of the car had he so desired (R. 83-84). 
He admitted that if Jongsma leaned away from him 
after he attached himself to the car, it was possible that he 
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did so to get away from the revolver. In fact, that was 
his only explanation (R. 8 5 -86). 
He testified that he did not come in contact with any 
mail boxes and was still riding on the car when it struck 
the post. He did not come in contact with the post itself. 
Nor did he lose consciousness. He jumped up imme-
diately and ran as fast as he could over two hundred feet 
after Jongsma. He was still holding onto the flash light, 
but had lost the gun somewhere between the telephone 
pole and where he came to rest (R. 88-90). 
The plaintiff testified that after he had attached 
himself to the car, he could not get off, as he would have 
spun into the side of a parked car (R. 36). He did not 
know the identity of this parked car and said it was moved 
shortly following the accident. He is the only one who 
testified with reference to this car. However, it is sig-
nificant that from the diagram which the plaintiff drew 
and which was offered in evidence as Exhibit P-1, that 
there was 37 feet between the point where he attache~ 
himself to the car and the point where he claimed the 
parked car was located. 
The defendant Jeffrey Jongsma testified he was 16 
years of age, that the plaintiff walked out about in the 
middle of the street and stood near the rear of the Broad-
head truck about 2 5 or 3 0 feet from the Kay vehicle. Both 
he and Kay testified that the plaintiff said, ucome out, 
you sons of bitches" (R. 125). They did not come out 
and both denied telling the plaintiff uto go to hell" (R. 
12 5, 145). Jongsma also denied saying anything to Kay 
(R. 126). Jongsma testified that he intended to drive the 
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car away to distract the plaintiff's attention so that Kay 
could get away (R. 126). He said the motor of the car 
was already running and he started up, proceeding straight 
west. He never turned toward the middle of the street 
(R. 127). He said that the plaintiff said, ((Stop or I will 
blow your head off." He was scared when he saw the gun 
and didn't think straight and continued ahead, trying to 
keep as far away as possible from the plaintiff so that 
he wouldn't get caught (R. 128). He denied that he 
accelerated sharply but said that he gradually accelerated 
(R. 128-129). As he was going by, the plaintiff came 
over from the center of the street and ((jumped onto the 
car" (R. 207). The car was equipped with a standard 
transmission (R. 20 5) but the low gear was broken and did 
not work at all. He had to start in second gear (R. 206). 
The hinge on the door was toward the front of the car 
and it opened from the door post toward the front of 
the car (R. 206). The flash light was pointing right in his 
eyes so that he couldn't see and the gun was at his head. The 
plaintiff said, ((Stop or I will blow your head off." He 
then heard the trigger click. He was not thinking straight 
and couldn't describe what happened thereafter, as he was 
so scared (R. 207-208). He did not recall lying down 
in the seat, nor did he consciously accelerate the vehicle. 
He did not intend to injure himself or the plaintiff, but 
uwas just thinking about whether he was going to shoot 
me or not" (R. 208-209). He never saw the telephone 
pole into which he collided (R. 209). He never made any 
statements to the plaintiff at all. The plaintiff at no time 
said ((For God's sake stop" (R. 134). He denied that he 
ever pushed the door of the car open and claimed it was 
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closed when the plaintiff grabbed onto it (R. 210) . He 
never had any idea of what he was really doing after the 
plaintiff put the gun at his head, and told him he was 
going to kill him (R. 210). 
He testified that he did not actually know how the 
plaintiff was holding onto the car because he could not 
see with the flash light in his eyes (R. 213-215). 
He recalled talking to an officer the next morning 
and telling him he didn't know how fast he was going when 
he struck the pole. The officer told him he had to give 
him something for the record, and he therefore gave him 
an arbitrary figure, but did not actually know how fast 
he was going ( R. 218 ) . 
According to the pretrial order the plaintiff's posi-
tion was that Jongsma ({wilfully undertook such action 
as he thought would frighten the plaintiff, but without 
intending to injure" (R. 9) . The plaintiff indicated that 
this was likewise his intention when he took the revolver 
and attempted to apprehend Jongsma and Kay. (R. 15 5-
156). 
Appellant claims that the defendant Jongsma was 
not corroborated by anyone, but that the testimony of the 
plaintiff was corroborated. This is wholly incorrect. No 
plaintiff's witness testified as to the circumstances that 
transpired from the time the plaintiff reached the middle 
of the street, and the actions of the plaintiff and the de-
fendant Jongsma thereafter. The plaintiff's son, Paul 
Ferguson, testified that he had heard someone stealing 
gasoline and came into the house and notified his father, 
but he readily admitted that he was on the porch of the 
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house when the incident took place; that he could not 
see where his father was located as his view was blocked 
by son1e bushes (R. 168). He did not see the car start 
up (R. 175) and was not aware of anything that trans-
pired after his father had left the driveway and went out 
of his vision until he later saw him down by the tele-
phone pole (R. 176). 
The defendant Kay, from his position behind the 
truck, did not actually see the car move forward and 
thereafter he started to run away, so that he did not know 
what had transpired until after the incident was all over 
(R. 146 and 221). 
The case as presented to the jury, therefore, in-
volved a choice as to whether it would believe the version 
as given by the defendant Jongsma or the version as 
given by the plaintiff. The conflict between the testi-
mony of these parties on the essential particulars was 
so sharp that the jury had the choice of believing one or 
the other. By its verdict it is clear that the jury adopted 
Jongsma's version of the accident. 
Appellant makes reference to the serious nature of 
the plaintiff's injury. In this connection Dr. Ronald W. 
King, the plaintiff's attending doctor, testified that on 
the evening of the accident, the plaintiff was ambulatory 
and walked into his office (R. 107-108). His injuries 
at that time consisted of a bruised right elbow (R. 101), 
an abrasion of the left wrist and forearm where the skin 
was rubbed off, a hematoma on the right thigh extending 
up a little into the groin, and a large abrasion of each 
buttocks. He was suffering from a degree of light shock 
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(R. 102). The doctor dressed his bruises and released 
him to his home ( R. 1 0 3 ) • These in juries all cleared up 
without incident (R. 108). Plaintiff testified that ap-
proxtmately two years prior to the accident he had been 
hospitalized for a. perforated ulcer, under the treatment 
of Dr. J. B. Fowler. However, he claimed that within six 
months thereafter he had recovered and did not experience 
any further trouble and had been eating normally for a 
year and a half prior to the accident (R. 54) ; that his 
health was excellent. He did not know what caused his 
first ulcer other than nervousness or emotional stress or 
bad eating habits. Two days after the accident his ulcer 
hemorrhaged again. The treatment he received for 
that was the same as the treatment he received for the 
previous ulcer hemorrhage. In each instance he was given 
blood transfusions and placed on a special diet and in each 
instance he was off work three weeks (R. 93). 
He also testified he had been hospitalized for a year 
in the Army on account of asthma, for which he had re-
ceived a 10ft!~ permanent disability rating (R. 9 3). He 
admitted testifying by deposition that for over a year 
prior to the auto accident he ate what he wanted and 
drank what he wanted (R. 94) . The symptoms which 
he had in the second hemorrhage were exactly the same 
which he had on the occasion of the first hemorrhage 
(R. 97-98). In connection ·with his first hospitalization 
prior to the accident, he admitted that he must have told 
the attending doctor that he ruined his stomach in Burma 
(R. 152). 
While Dr. King testified that in his opinion the per-
foration following the automobile accident was caused by 
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the accident, he nonetheless testified that any person who 
had suffered from a perforated ulcer should maintain 
what he termed a chronic ulcer diet for the rest of his 
life and that if he went off that diet, that it would 
increase the likelihood of a hemorrhage recurring (R. 
111 ) . He said that the diet on which he now had the 
plaintiff was the same that the plaintiff should have 
had following his first ulcer episode (R. 110). He also 
testified that most hemorrhaging of ulcers was caused by 
anxiety or eating habits, stress or strain, rather than by 
accident. 
It was not contended that the plaintiff's hospitaliza-
tion was due to anything other than the hemorrhaging of 
the ulcer. The plaintiff admitted that he returned to 
work within three weeks following the accident and was 
thereafter performing all of his duties (R. 92). The doc-
tor testified that a person generally recovered from an 
ulcer within a period of three to four months from its 
occurrence ( R. 114) . 
Appellant claims that Jongsma changed his testimony 
about the manner in which the plaintiff was hanging 
onto the car. This was admitted by Jongsma, who stated 
that he was confused when examined as an adverse witness 
by plaintiff's counsel. He testified, however, that with 
the flash light in his eyes and the gun at his head, he 
could not actually see how the plaintiff was hanging onto 
the car. He definitely denied opening the door on the 
plaintiff (R. 210). The jury by its verdict believed 
Jongsma's testimony and was not impressed by counsel's 
argument about the discrepancies. The factual issue was 
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decided against the plaintiff and is not raised on this 
appeal. 
Both at the trial and in his brief plaintiff attempted 
to characterize Jongsma and Kay as culprits. The jury 
was not impressed by this line of argument and, as a mat-
ter of fact, there was nothing in the evidence to show 
that Jongsma had ever been involved in any prior trouble. 
Kay admitted one previous attempt at stealing gasoline, 
for which he was apprehended. On the other hand, the 
plaintiff was portrayed to the jury by his testimony as a 
brazen and foolhardy person who threw all caution to 
the wind, who acted recklessly in using a revolver in an 
attempt to frightt:n and apprehend two juveniles; that he 
recklessly jumped on the moving car to accomplish his 
avowed purpose and recklessly pointed a revolver at Jongs-
ma's head, flashing a light in his eyes, and threatened to 
blow his brains out. The jury had the opportunity of 
seeing and observing the actions and demeanor of the 
witnesses as well as hearing their testimony and the jury, 
from its verdict, chose to believe Jongsma's version of the 
accident. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO CHARGE THE 
JURY THAT CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IS 
NO DEFENSE TO WILFUL, W ANTO·N OR RECK-
LESS MISCO·NDUCT AND IN CHARGING THE 
JURY ON SAID DEFENSE WITHOUT REGARD TO 
THE ALLEGED WILFUL, WANTON AND RECK-
LESS CO·NDUCT OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 16, 
WHICH CORRECTLY STATED THE LAW OF THE 
CASE AND WHICH DID NOT SHIFT THE BUR-
DEN OF PROOF 0'N THE ISSUES OF CONTRIBU-
TORY NEGLIGENCE AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT CO·MMIT PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 
16, 17 18, 19, AND 20, WHICH CORRECTLY AP-
PLIED THE DOCTRINE OF ASSUMED RISK TO 
THE FACTS OF THE CASE. 
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POINT IV. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURY THAT THE LAW REQUIRES MOTORISTS 
TO DRIVE ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE HIGH-
WAY. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTION NO.7 PERTAINING TO THE DUTY 
OF THE PLAINTIFF WHEN CONFRONTED WITH 
SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED PERIL. 
POINT VI. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO PERMIT THE 
PLAINTIFF TO CROSS EXAMINE THE DEFEND-
ANT KAY WITH REFERENCE TO CONVERSA-
TIONS WHICH TOOK PLACE IMMEDIATELY 
FOLLOWING THE APPELLANT'S INJURIES. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDI-
CIAL ERRO,R IN REFUSING TO CHARGE THE 
JURY THAT CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IS 
NO DEFENSE TO WILFUL, WANTON OR RECK-
LESS MISCONDUCT AND IN CHARGING THE 
JURY ON SAID DEFENSE WITHOUT REGARD TO 
THE ALLEGED WILFUL, WANTON AND RECK-
LESS CONDUCT 0'F THE DEFENDANTS. 
The appellant contends that the defendant Jongsma 
was guilty of wilful, wanton and reckless conduct and 
that by reason thereof contributory negligence was no 
defense. While this may be true as a general proposition, 
it was not true under the facts in this case. 
Plaintiff complains of the court's failure to give his 
requested instruction No. 12, which reads as follows: 
((You are instructed that it is no defense so far 
as the injuries to Mr. Ferguson are concerned that 
he was guilty of negligence contributing to his 
injuries, if the conduct of the defendant Jeffrey 
Jongsma in the operation of the Ford automobile 
amounted to wilfulness, wantonness or recklessness. 
((In this regard if you find from a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the defendant Jeffrey 
Jongsma intentionally turned the automobile he 
was operating in the direction of the plaintiff and 
drove said automobile directly at the plaintiff or 
that the defendant Jongsma intentionally opened 
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the door of the car he was operatng in an attempt 
to strike the plaintiff with said door and if you 
further find from a preponderance of the evidence 
that such conduct on the part of the said Jongsma 
was a proximate cause of the injuries of plaintiff, 
then you are instructed that the plaintiff is entitled 
to recover regardless of any negligence on his part." 
This instruction is erroneous when applied to the 
facts in this case. The first paragraph is not even a cor-
rect statement of the law. At best it is only half true. It 
also included a wilful act which had been expressly elim-
inated from the case by the pretrial order. 
See American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law 
of Torts, Vol. 2, page 1262, Subdivision (2): 
rr A plaintiff is barred from recovery for, harm 
caused by the defendant's reck)ess disregard for the 
plaintiff's safety if, knowing of the defendanfs 
reckless 1nisconduct and the danger involved to 
him therein, the plaintiff recklessly exposes him-
self thereto." 
Contributory negligence consists of different types 
as illustrated in Section 466, page 1230 of the American 
Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Torts, which 
reads as follows: 
HThe plaintiff's contributory negligence may 
be either 
(a) An intentional and unreasonable exposure 
of himself to danger created by the defendant's 
negligence of which danger the plaintiff knows 
orl has reason to know, or 
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(b) Conduct which, in respects other than 
those stated in Clause (a), falls short of the stand-
ard to which the reasonable man should conform 
in order to protect himself from harm." 
Included in that class referred to in paragraph (a) 
is any voluntary exposure to an unreasonable risk. In com-
menting upon this type of contributory negligence, the 
Restatement of the Law of Torts says: 
((This form of contributory negligence is fre-
quently called ~~voluntary assumption of risk." 
However, since the plaintiff must not only know 
of the danger, but must also encounter it without 
any reasonabJe necessity of so doing, his conduct 
actually amounts to a voluntary exposure of him-
self to an unreasonable risk." 
See also American Law Institute, Restatement of the 
Law of Torts, Section 50 3, page 1299, subparagraph ( 2) , 
which reads as follows: 
(((2) An actor whose conduct is in reckless 
disregard of his own safety is barred from recovery 
against a defendant whose reckless disregard of the 
actor's safety is a contributory cause of the actor's 
bodily harm." 
In other words, while simple contributory negligence 
may not be a bar to the action if the defendant Jongsma 
acted in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's safety, it is 
such a bar where the plaintiff himself, knowing of the 
defendant's reckless conduct, nevertheless voluntarily 
exposes himself thereto. 
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See also Rogers v. Chicago Transit Authority (Ill.), 
92 N. E. 2d 776. In that case the decedent got mad be-
cause two street cars had passed without stopping. When 
a third one approached, he went out and stood in the 
middle of the track and raised his hand, at which time 
the street car was about 120 feet away, was coming rather 
rapidly, and directly for him. He did not move from the 
track until too late and thereby got struck by the car and 
wa,s killed. The jury made a special finding that the 
defendant was guilty of wilful and wanton conduct. The 
appellate court held that there was no evidence of wilful 
or wanton conduct on the part of the defendant but that 
the decedent himself was guilty of wilful and wanton 
conduct which in any event proximately contributed to 
the accident. The court said: 
((Contributory wilful and wanton miscon-
duct, if established, is a complete defense to an ac-
tion charging the same wrong." 
See also Schneider v. Brecht (Cal.) , 44 P. 2d 662, 
wherein the court said: 
((While it is true, generally speaking that or-
dinary negligence on the part of a plaintiff is not 
a defense upon which a defendant may rely when 
the complaint is based upon a charge of wilful 
misconduct, this overlooks a principle which we 
think must be considered, to wit: That where 
the negligence of the plaintiff is of such a charac-
ter that it contributes to, and really becomes a 
part of, and the inducing cause of the defendant's 
wilful misconduct, 110 recovery can be or should 
be had." (Italics ours) . 
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See also Prater v. Buell (Ill.), 84 N. E. 2d 676. See 
Hinkle v. Minneapolis, A. & C. Range R. Co. (Minn.), 
202 N. W. 340, wherein it is said: 
((The theory of these variations of negligence 
leads to but one logical conclusion, and that is that 
the same basic reason which causes contributory 
negligence to prevent a recovery in an action sound-
ing in ordinary negligence also prevents a recovery 
by one who is guilty of wilful and wanton negli-
gence. Such negligence is just as efficient to offset 
the defendant's negligence of the same character as 
contributory negligence offsets ordinary negli-
gence. There can be no more comparative wan-
tonness than there can be comparative negligence. 
When both parties are guilty of such negligence 
neither can be selected as that which is the proxi-
mate cause, and hence the law must leave both 
where it finds them. The conclusion is inevitable, 
even though its application be fraught with diffi-
culties." 
See also to the same effect Gulf, Mobile & Ohio 
Railroad Co. v. Freund, 183 F. 2d 1005. In Gill v. 
Arthur (Ohio), 43 N. E. 2d 894, the court held that a 
guest suffering an injury because of wilful or wanton 
misconduct of the host driver cannot recover if he ex-
posed himself to an obvious and appreciated danger, hold-
ing that one who exposes himself to such a danger, rreven 
though he does not appreciate the full extent of the 
danger, rassumes the risk' of injury that may result to 
him therefrom." 
In Wold v. Ogden City, 123 Utah 270, 258 P. 2d 
453, the plaintiff was held to have exposed himself to a 
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known danger allegedly in exercise of a right and privilege 
which he had to use the highways and streets, in connec-
tion with which the Utah court said: 
((But such right and privilege are not without 
limitation and certainly cannot include the prerog-
ative of use without the exercise of due care. It 
would seem that a reasonable, prudent person 
would not expose himself to a known danger when 
there is an easy, known and convenient route 
around it. Plaintiff's conduct, aside from the 
concept of assumption of risk, was unreasonable 
in the light of this known hazard and the existence 
of a convenient, hardly burdensome detour at the 
intersection of Grant and 18th Street, where the 
trench ended and through which plaintiff had 
driven shortly before his injury. To deliberately 
attempt to cross under such circumstances seems 
to be that type of lack of due care not attributable 
to the ordinary prudent person exercising care for 
his own safety." 
Under the plaintiff's version of the accident he 
acted in a reckless and foolhardy manner. He watched the 
car from the time it first started to move forward slowly, 
while it allegedly turned sharply towards him and acceler-
ated. He admitted he could have moved completely away 
from the car by taking a couple of steps and he ((would 
have been safe." He said he knew what he was doing 
and knew how to handle the situation. To remain stand-
ing in front of a car which is being turned directly towards 
an individual and which he claims is greatly accelerating is 
certainly reckless. This is the situation covered in the 
Rogers case. Thereafter it was not necessary for the 
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plaintiff to jump on the car. Its speed, according to 
him, was 1 0 miles per hour or less.; the door, even if 
opened, would only have closed by contact with his body. 
The impact was slight because it did not jar either the gun 
or the flash light from his hands but he nonetheless jumped 
on th-. car, still intent upon making it stop. This was 
foolhardy and reckless. After getting on the car, accord-
ing to him, it was traveling 10 miles per hour or less. 
He nevertheless continued to ride thereon for a distance 
of 3 7 feet before it reached the car which he alleged was 
parked by the side of the road. 
The plaintiff admitted that he intended to frighten 
Jongsma and Kay, but not to injure them. This is the 
same conduct which he claims stamps the stigma of wilful 
and wanton upon Jongsma's conduct. In the pretrial 
order he claims that Jongsma intended to frighten, but 
not to InJure. If such conduct on the part of Jongsma 
was wilful, reckless or wanton, then the plaintiff by his 
own admission has so characterized his own conduct. 
Plaintiff testified that he took the gun for psychologi-
cal reasons, to frighten the defendants, intending them 
to think it was loaded and because if he did not have a 
gun, he couldn't make people stop ((unless you can over-
take them and beat them into submission." This testi-
mony showed a calloused attitude and utter indifference 
on the part of the plaintiff so that the jury could well 
find his own conduct in the entire matter was not only 
unreasonble, but evidenced a recklessness and vindictive-
ness on his own part. 
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There was the testimony of Jongsma that he did not 
turn toward the plaintiff, was keeping as far away from 
him as possible, when the plaintiff came over, jumped on 
the car, put the flash light in his eyes, the revolver at his 
head, and threatened to shoot him. This conduct on the 
part of the plaintiff was likewise reckless. 
Under this evidence, it would have been error to 
have given the first paragraph of the plaintiff's requested 
Instruction No. 12. It did not indicate to the jury that 
even though Jongsma's conduct was found to be wilful, 
wanton, or reckless, that nonetheless the plaintiff would 
be barred from recovery if his own conduct, whether 
termed contributory negligence or assumption of risk, 
likewise amounted to a reckless exposure to danger. 
The second paragraph of the requested instruction is 
open to even more serious objection. It was not the in-
tentional driving toward the plaintiff or the intentional 
opening of the door, if any, which caused the plaintiff's 
alleged injury. This part of the instruction attempts to 
inject into the case an intentional injury which was ex-
pressly eliminated from the case in the pretrial order. It 
could, at best, be proper only if the alleged intentional 
acts were found by the jury to have been committed in 
wanton and reckless disregard of the plaintiff's safety 
and if the plaintiff did not recklessly or wantonly expose 
himself to the danger. 
As indicated in the citation quoted by the plaintiff 
from Vol. 3 8 Am. Jur. page 8 54, ((So far as wanton con-
duct is concerned, some discernment must be exercised by 
the courts, or the defense of contributory negligence will 
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be barred in any case merely by the artifice of describing 
the conduct of the defendant as wanton." 
It was and is our position that if the defendant Jongs-
ma was negligent, the instruction on contributory negli-
gence was proper. If the defendant Jongsma was guilty 
of wilful, wanton or reckless conduct, that the defense 
was still proper because the plaintiff's conduct was char-
acterized by the same stigma. To have given the instruc-
tion in the form or manner requested by the plaintiff 
would have been gross error. 
Where a requested instruction is erroneous or mis-
leading, it is not error for the court to refuse to give the 
same. See P. A. Sorensen Co. v. Denver & R. G. R. Co. 
49 Ut., 45 8, 164 P. 1020. See also to the same effect 53 
Am. Jur. Section 525 at page 422, wherein it is said: 
((A requested instruction must be calculated 
to give the jury an accurate understanding of 
the law, having reference to the phase of the case 
to which it is applicable. It is, of course, not in-
cumbent upon the trial court to give any requested 
instruction which is an erroneous statement of the 
law or is otherwise improper under the facts of 
the case. The trial court may properly refuse a 
requested charge which is unintelligible, incom-
plete, or argumentative, or which might prove mis-
leading or confusing to the jury; a requested in-
struction requiring the jury to decide questions of 
law; an instruction which is too general or too 
broad or omits some qualification or limitation 
necessary to make it properly applicable to the 
facts of the case; or a request not broad enough to 
cover the whole law of the case on the point." 
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See also Gill v. Arthur (Ohio), 43 N. E. 2d 894. 
The case of laconia v. D'Angelo (N. J.), 142 A. 46, 
58 A. L. R. 614, is certainly not in point. In that case the 
driver actually pushed a person from the car's running 
board. Under those circum.stances the driver consciously 
did a wrongful act. 
In this case there was evidence of negligence on the 
part of each party. There was also evidence of recklessness 
on the part of each party. The instructions given were 
appropriate. It could make no difference whether the 
conduct is described as negligence or wilful, wanton, or 
reckless when the evidence indicated that either party 
could be found guilty of the same type of conduct. By 
whatever name called, the defense would apply. 
The court did submit to the jury the issue of wilful, 
wanton and reckless conduct in Instruction No. 26 on 
punitive damages and quite properly instructed that be-
fore any award could be made therefor, the issues gener-
ally must be found in favor of the plaintiff and against 
the defendant. As bearing on the punitive damages, the 
court in Instruction No. 27 defined recklessness, and in 
No. 2 8 defined wilful conduct. 
We do not believe that there was any evidence to show 
that the plaintiff's injury was caused by any wilful, wan-
ton, or reckless conduct on the part of the defendant 
Jongsma. Wilfulness was expressly eliminated by the pre-
trial order. There was no recklessness. Under the plain-
tiff's own testimony, the car was about 12 feet to the 
east of him and a little to the north, so that on a diagonal 
line it was about 20 feet away from him. According to 
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plaintiff, the car then moved straight forward very slowly 
at a speed of one to two miles per hour for a distance of 
3, 5, 7 ,or 10 feet. The car was then approximatey 2 to 5 
feet to the east and somewhat to the north of him. At this 
time it is claimed the car was turned directly toward the 
plaintiff and accelerated greatly. The distance of the 
car from the plaintiff at this time would make it physi-
cally impossible for the driver to have turned it sharply 
toward the plaintiff or to have accelerated in any material 
degree from its one to two mile an hour speed. The 
plaintiff's testimony in this regard is against the physical 
facts and cannot be believed. The front end of the car 
did not strike the plaintiff. Plaintiff claims that the door 
was thrown open against him. Bearing in mind that the 
hinge on the door was to the front and considering the 
low speed at which the car must have been traveling, even 
under the plaintiff's own testimony nothing would have 
happened except for the door on the car to close. The 
plaintiff would not have been injured. The impact had 
to be slight. It did not jar either the gun or the flash light 
from his hands. Up to this point there is no evidence to 
support any wilful, wanton, or reckless act which was a 
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. After the plain-
tiff attached himself to the car, the defendant Jongsma 
was frightened and confused because the plaintiff had the 
flash light shining in his eyes and a revolver at his head. 
He readily admitted that he did not know what he was 
doing thereafter. Plaintiff conceded that if Jongsma 
did lie down in the seat, the only explanation was to get 
away from the gun. Nothing that Jongsma did thereafter 
could be classed as a conscious indifference to the plaintiff's 
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rights. If Jongsma was trying to get the plaintiff off the 
car so that he could escape, he would not have run into a 
telephone pole, thereby wreck the car, and bring about 
his own apprehension. The only possible explanation for 
the course of the car is the fact that Jongsma was fright-
ened; that he could not see where he was going, and 
did not know what he was doing. 
See Rogers v. Chicago Transit Authority, supra, 
wherein it is said that the conduct must exhibit a rr con-
scious indifference to consequence." See also Price v. 
Schroeder (Cal.), 96 P. 2d 949, wherein it was held that 
a guest could not recover for injuries where the mental 
condition of the driver, which was the basis of the charge 
of wilful misconduct, was induced by the active partici-
pation of the guest. 
Under the evidence 1n this case it is inconceivable 
that the jury could find that Jongsma was operating 
the car with a conscious indifference to the plaintiff when 
he could not see where he was going and while frightened 
by a gun pointed at his head. He was unable to see the 
road, did not consciously accelerate the car, and did not 
know what was happening. 
It must be borne in mind that the plaintiff specifical-
ly eliminated any actual intent to injure. He took the 
position in the pretrial order that the defendant Jongsma 
((wilfully undertook such action as he thought would 
frighten the plaintiff but without intending to injure." 
This eliminates any actual(intent from the case. See Bar-
tolucci v. Falleti (Ill.), 46 N. E. 2d 980. 
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The plaintiff, by his requested instructions Nos. 4, 
5, and 6 recognized that the plaintiff's conduct might bar 
him from recovery because each of these instructions con-
cluded with the phrase, ((unless you find that plaintiff is 
barred from recovery by his own conduct." 
There was no error in failing to give the plaintiff's 
requested Instruction No. 12. 
POINT II. 
THE CO~URT DID NOT CO·MMIT PREJUDI-
CIAL ERRO·R IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 16. 
THIS INSTRUCTION CO·RRECTL Y STATED THE 
LAW OF THE CASE AND DID NOT SHIFT THE 
BURDEN OF PRO·OF O·N THE ISSUES OF CON-
TIUBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND ASSUMPTION 
OF RISK. 
The instruction complained of reads as follows: 
((In this action before you may return a ver-
dict in favor of the plaintiff and against the de-
fendants Jeffrey Paul Jongsma, Jacob J. Jongsma 
and Vaughn William Kay, you must find from a 
preponderance of the evidence that each of the 
following three propositions are true: 
((Proposition No. 1: That defendant Jongs-
ma was negligent. 
((Proposition No. 2: That said negligence was 
a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, and 
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((Proposition No. 3: That the plaintiff him-
self was not guilty of contr~utory negligence 
and that the plaintiff, by his action and conduct, 
did not assume the risk of the occurrence as here-
after defined." 
Appellant complains that the instruction is errone-
ous because the jury must find from a preponderance of 
the evidence that Jongsma was negligent and that the 
plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence. His 
complaint is that this shifts the burden of proof. The 
appellant must not have thought much of this point be-
cause no exception was taken to the instruction on this 
particular ground (R. 230). Furthermore, the instruc-
tion says nothing about who has the burden of proof on 
any of the propositions. It correctly indicates that each 
must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. 
In Instruction No. 6 the court instructed the jury on the 
burden of proof and stated that the burden of proof as 
to any disputed or controverted fact rests upon the 
party who alleges the fact. In Instruction No. 3 the 
court instructed the jury that the plaintiff alleged the 
defendant was negligent and that the defendant claimed 
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence or 
assumption of risk. The instructions must be considered 
together as a whole and when so considered they indicated 
that the plaintiff had the burden of proof on the issue 
of the defendant's negligence, but that the defendant had 
the burden on the issue of contributory negligence. There 
was no error in the instruction as given. 
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POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 16, 
17, 18, 19, AND 20, WHICH CORRECTLY APPLIED 
THE DOCTRINE OF ASSUMED RISK TO THE 
FACTS OF THE CASE. 
These instructions correctly applied the doctrine of 
assumed risk to the facts of the case. They did not ignore 
the alleged wilful and reckless conduct of the defendant 
Jongsma. The court did not err in refusing to charge 
the jury with respect to said conduct. Instructions Nos. 
16 through 20 embodied the defendants' theory of the 
case. The facts disclosed a sharp conflict in the testimony 
between the only parties testifying with reference thereto, 
namely, the defendant Jongsma and the plaintiff. Jongs-
ma claimed that the plaintiff ran from a position of safety 
over to where the car was being operated, jumped onto 
the same, and that thereafter the plaintiff pointed a re-
volver at his head, threatened to kill him, and held the 
flash light in his eyes so that he could not see where he 
was going. This was denied by the plaintiff. 
The last paragraph of Instruction No. 16 instructed the 
jury that if it found from a preponderance of the evidence 
that the plaintiff blinded the defendant Jongsma or sub-
stantially interfered with his vision by flashing a lighted 
flash light in his face, that the plaintiff could thereafter 
not complain of any negligence on the part of Jongsma 
in failing to keep a proper lookout or in failing to have his 
vehicle under proper control or in driving on the wrong 
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side of the road because the plaintiff£, in such. event, by 
his own action and conduct, assumed the risk of the 
driver's inability to see or otherwise properly operate the 
automobile under such distracting influence. If the plain-
tiff jumped onto the car and put the flash light in Jongs-
ma's eyes, as Jongsma testified, he could not thereafter 
complain about Jongsma's conduct in operating the car. 
In other words, his own actions prevented Jongsma from 
properly operating the car. The plaintiff might just as well 
have put his hands over Jongsma's eyes and then complain-
ed of his operation of the vehicle. The jury had the choice 
of adopting Jongsma's version or the plaintiff's version. 
There was no middle ground. There was no error in this 
instruction. 
Instruction No. 17 instructed the jury that if it found 
from a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff 
pointed a revolver at Jongsma's head and threatened to 
kill him so that Jongsma became frightened and was 
unable to keep a proper lookout or properly operate the 
automobile under this distracting influence, then the 
plaintiff could not complain of Jongsma's failure to keep 
a lookout or properly operate the automobile. This was 
also under the defendants' theory of the case and properly 
charged the jury. If the plaintiff, by his own action and 
conduct, as indicated by Jongsma's testimony, induced 
Jongsma's confused mental state so that he was unable to 
operate the vehicle, the plaintiff could not complain. In 
this connection the plaintiff admitted that he had intend-
ed to frighten Jongsma. How well he accomplished his 
purpose is shown by the results. A person cannot com-
plain of another's mental state or attitude when he him-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
31 
self has induced that state or attitude. See Price v. 
Schroeder (Cal.), 96 P. 2d 949. 
Complaint is made of Instruction No. 18, which 
charged the jury that if it found from a preponderance 
of the evidence that the plaintiff, in the exercise of ordi-
nary care, had an opportunity to move from the path of 
the car but failed to do so, that by such conduct he as-
sumed the risk. The plaintiff failed to except to this 
instruction on the basis which he now urges. 
Here, again, this instruction was on the defendants' 
theory and based upon the plaintiff's admitted statement 
that he was watching the car at all times, knew what 'was 
going on, knew that the car was being turned directly 
toward him and accelerated, could have moved from the 
path to a position of safety away from the car, but chose 
to remain there. We submit that there was no error in 
this instruction under the facts in this case. 
Instruction No. 19 advised the jury that if it found 
that the plaintiff jumped onto the automobile and at-
tempted to hang thereon while the same was in motion, that 
he assumed the risk. This instruction was under the de-
fendant's testimony that the plaintiff moved from a posi-
tion of safety over to the car and jumped thereon, which 
was denied by the plaintiff. Here, again, there was no 
middle ground. The jury had to believe Jongsma or the 
plaintiff. If the plaintiff did in fact move from a posi-
tion of safety as testified by Jongsma and jump onto the 
moving car, he thereby assumed the risk. 
In Instruction No. 20, the court instructed that if 
the plaintiff failed to get off the vehicle if he had a reason-
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able opportunity to do so, he then assumed the risk of 
remaining on thereafter. Here, again, no exception was 
taken to this instruction on this particular ground, but 
only on the ground that it failed to take into consideration 
plaintiff's theory that Jongsma was not entitled to rely 
on the defense of contributory negligence or assumption 
of risk if his own conduct amounted to wilfulness, reck-
lessness, or wantonness, and that there was no evidence 
that the plaintiff had an opportunity to detach himself 
from the car. The evidence clearly disclosed that even 
under the plaintiff's own testimony, the vehicle was 
traveling at a speed of 10 miles per hour or less when the 
plaintiff got on it and that it traveled a distance of 37 
feet thereafter before allegedly approaching a parked ve-
hicle, during all of which time the plaintiff could have 
got off the vehicle had he so desired. 
The plaintiff complains that these instructions 
amounted to a directed verdict for the defendants. This 
is not the case. The jury had to adopt Jongsma's version 
of the accident. The instructions, in any event, must be 
considered in their entirety. Instruction No. 3 outlined 
the issues and contentions of the parties with reference to 
negligence, contributory negligence, and assumption of 
risk and informed the jury that the plaintiff sought to 
recover punitive damages because of alleged wilful or 
reckless conduct on the part of the defendant Jongsma. 
Instruction No. 8 e was given at the plaintiff's re-
quest and reads as follows: 
ue. There is a legal principle commonly re-
ferred to by the term (assumption of risk,' which 
is as follows: 
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((One is said to assume a risk when he voluntar-
ily manifests his assent to dangerous conduct or 
to the creation or maintenance of a dangerous con-
clition and voluntarily exposes himself to that 
danger, or when he knows, or in the exercise of 
ordinary care would know, that a danger exists in 
either the conduct or condition of another, or in 
the condition, use or operation of property, and 
voluntarily places himself or remains within the 
position of danger." 
Instruction No. 23 was also given at the plaintiff's 
request and reads as follows: 
((In order to find that the plaintiff voluntar-
ily assumed the risk of personal injury, you must 
find by a preponderance of the evidence that his 
words or conduct clearly indicated that he knew 
of the danger created by the conduct of the de-
fendant Jeffrey Jongsma, that he voluntarily sub-
jected himself thereto and that he consented that if 
injury result the defendant Jeffrey Jongsma should 
be relieved of any liability therefor." 
In Instruction No. 34 the jury was instructed that 
the instructions should be considered as a whole and each 
instruction read and understood with reference to the en-
tire charge and not as though one instruction separately 
was intended to state the whole law upon any par-
ticular point; that the jury should not single out any 
certain sentence or any individual point or instruction 
and ignore the others, but was to consider all of the instruc-
tions as a whole and to regard each in light of the others. 
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It is also claimed that a different rule must apply 
since the plaintiff had the right to arrest or apprehend the 
defendants and was in the exercise of a right or privilege. 
This, however does not justify the plaintiff in acting in an 
unreasonable manner. See Wold v. Ogden City, 123 Ut. 
270, 258, P. 2d 453. See also Restatement of the Law of 
Torts, Section 473, page 1243, which reads as follows: 
((If the defendant's negligence has made the 
plaintiff's exercise of a right or privilege impos-
sible unless he knowingly exposes himself to a risk 
of bodily harm, the plaintiff is not guilty of con-
tributory negligence in so doing unless the risk 
is unreasonable." (Italics ours) . 
In other words, even if the plaintiff is in the exer-
cise of a lawful right to arrest, he does not thereby have 
any right to expose himself to any unreasonable risk. The 
comment under this section reads as follows: 
((In determining whether the risk to which the 
plaintiff must subject himself in order to exercise 
his right or privilege is reasonable or unreasonable, 
the same considerations are decisive which are 
stated in Sec. 291, as determining the unreasonable 
character of the risk to which an actor has subject-
ed others. In both cases, the value which the law 
attaches to the interest to be served by the exercise 
of the right or privilege, as compared with the risk 
which must be encountered, is of primary im-
portance. Among other considerations to be taken 
into account is the existence of an alternative 
method by which the right or privilege could be 
exercised and the inconvenience and risk involved 
in its use. :.'- * :.'- The plaintiff may be barred from 
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recovery by exposing himself to a danger created 
by the defendant's negligence even though there 
is no other method available by which he could 
secure the exercise of his right or privilege. Wheth-
er the risk is so great that the reasonable man 
would forego the exercise of his right or privilege 
rather than encounter it depends upon the circum-
stances of each particular case and, except in situa-
tions which have recurred with such frequency as 
to lead to binding judicial decision, is a matter for 
the judgment of the court and jury in accordance 
with the rule stated in Sec. 476." 
In this case the plaintiff had alternative methods. He 
admitted he could have got the license number. He also 
had the boy on foot. He had the choice of going after 
the boy in the car or the boy on foot. He could not go 
after both, as they were proceeding in opposite direc-
tions. He deliberately chose to go after the boy in the 
car. Under his version of the accident the jury was en-
titled to consider that his choice involved an unreason-
able exposure to danger. The plaintiff was not con-
fronted with any dilemma. He did not need to go after 
the car to apprehend the defendants. He could have 
gone after the boy on foot or could have taken the license 
number of the car, but he chose to jump on the car 
flash the light in the driver's eyes, the gun at his head, 
knowing that the boy on foot would thereby get away. 
Under the authorities cited, the jury could certainly 
consider whether this conduct was unreasonable. 
Complaint is also made that the instructions on as-
sumption of risk were erroneous because they wholly failed 
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to account for the effect of any wilful, reckless and 
wanton misconduct on the part of the defendant Jongs-
ma. This presents practically the same discussion as we 
have presented under Point I with the exception that Point 
I went to the question of contributory negligence and 
the discussion herein covers assemption of risk. The plain-
tiff's requested Instruction No. 11, and particularly the 
first paragraph thereof, is erroneous for the same reason 
that the plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 12 is im-
proper. In other words, assuming that assumption of 
risk might not generally be a defense to a wilful, wanton 
or reckless act, nonetheless, as indicated in our discussion 
under Point I, it would be a defense provided the plain-
tiff's own conduct was done in reckless disregard of his 
own safety or that his own conduct amounted to reck-
lessness under the circumstances. 
What was said regarding the second paragraph of the 
plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 12 under Point I 
likewise applies to the second paragraph of the plaintiff's 
requested Instruction No. 11. In other words, the harm 
in this type of an instruction is in attempting to have 
the jury characterize the defendant's conduct alone as 
being reckless without letting it use the same yardstick in 
interpreting whether the plaintiff's conduct was likewise 
reckless. This is particularly true in this case where the 
plaintiff testified that he knew everything that was go-
ing on, had watched the car from the time it first started 
forward, failed to move from its path notwithstanding he 
admitted he had such an opportunity, that his actions 
were designed to_ frighten_ the defendants ~ut not injure, 
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and by his very attitude in indicating that if he hadn't 
taken the gun, he might have had to beat the defendants 
into submission. The conduct of the two was exactly 
the same. If such conduct was only negligence on de-
fendant's part, it was contributory negligence on the 
plaintiff's part. If it amounted to recklessness or wil-
fulness on the defendant's part, then it likewise amounted 
to recklessness and wilfulness on the plaintiff's part. In 
either case it would have been a bar to recovery. Plain-
tiff cannot escape the effect of the law by attempting to 
state that contributory negligence or assumption of risk 
is no defense if the defendant's action is reckless or wan-
ton when the testimony in the case likewise shows that the 
plaintiff's conduct can likewise be stamped with the same 
stigma. 
The instruction is subject to the same further ob-
jection as indicated in Point I that it was not the driving 
of the car toward the plaintiff or the alleged opening of 
the door that caused the accident in any event. The 
instruction was improper in addition because it included 
a wilful act which had been expressly eliminated by the 
pretrial order and by the plaintiff's own contention that 
the defendant intended to frighten but not to injure. 
Plaintiff complains of the use of the words in certain 
of the instructions that if the plaintiff failed to move 
from the path of the car in the exercise of ordinary and 
reasonable care or if he had an opportunity in the exer-
cise of reasonable care to get off the car, then he assumed 
the risk. There was no error in the instructions as given 
and in the refusal to give the plaintiff's requested In-
struction No. 11. 
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POINT IV. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDI-
·CIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURY THAT THE LAW REQUIRES MOTO·RISTS 
TO DRIVE ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE HIGH-
WAY. 
The plaintiff complains of the court's failure to give 
his requested Instruction No. 8 which stated as a bald fact 
that Jongsma was guilty of negligence if he was driving 
on the wrong side of the road. This instruction wholly 
ignored the hotly contested issue in the case that if Jongsma 
was driving on the wrong side of the road, it was because 
of the plaintiff's conduct in flashing the light in his eyes 
and putting the gun at his head so that he could not see 
where he was going and was so frightened that he did not 
know what he was doing. This instruction would make 
Jongsma guilty of negligence, notwithstanding that he 
unknowingly got onto the wrong side of the road by 
reason of the plaintiff's own conduct. The court did 
correctly instruct the jury in Instruction No. 16 in which 
the jury was told that it could find the defendant Jongsma 
guilty if he knowingly drove on the wrong side of the 
road. We submit that under the facts in this case this 
was the only type of instruction to which the plaintiff 
was entitled. Obviously, if a person gets on the wrong 
side of the road because of the action or conduct of an-
other, he cannot be held guilty of negligence. The plain-
tiff might just as well have put his hands over the 
defendanes eyes and then claimed he was guilty of negli-
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gence in getting onto the wrong side of the road as to 
put a flash light in his eyes so that he could not see where 
he was going. The fact remains that the defendant was 
on the wrong side of the road and under the plaintiff's 
proposed instruction he would have been guilty of negli-
gence regardless of how he got there which is not and can-
not be the law. There was accordingly no error in re-
fusing to give the plaintiff's instruction as requested. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
FAILING TO GIVE THE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIO'N NO. 7 PERTAINING TO THE 
DUTY OF THE PLAINTIFF WHEN CONFRONT-
ED WITH SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED PERIL. 
The plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 7 pertains 
to sudden peril and the action of a person under such cir-
cumstances. Utah follows the general rule that a person 
is not entitled to the sudden emergency doctrine if the 
emergency is created by his own conduct. See Gittens v. 
Lundberg, 3 Ut. 2d. 392, 284, P. 2d 1115: 
rrw here the plaintif 1 creates the per# by his 
own fault, he may not thereafter urge the sudden 
emergency doctrine to protect himself front a 
charge of contributory negligence." 
In this case the evidence of the plaintiff clearly in-
dicated that he was not confronted with any emergency. 
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As a matter of fact, as he stood in the middle of the road, 
he observed the car when it first started to move 
forward. He watched it continously thereafter. He 
continued standing in the same spot and never moved, not-
withstanding that he was aware of the motions of the 
car, and notwithstanding that he admittedly could have 
missed the car completely by taking a couple of steps out 
of its path and would have been safe. The plaintiff 
deliberately and recklessly chose to stand in a position of 
known danger when he could easily have moved to a 
place of safety. Even when the door was alledgedly 
thrown open, which, of course, was denied by Jongsma, 
the impact of necessity would have been slight. The speed 
had to be low because the old car could not possibly 
accelerate in the short distance that then separated him 
from the car. The impact was definitely light because 
neither the flash light nor the gun was jarred out of his 
hands. At most, even assuming the door to have been 
opened, it would merely have gone closed by the contact 
with the plaintiff, and he would not have been injured. 
There was no necessity for his jumping on the car, but he 
was so hell bent on catching the youngster that he 
jumped onto the car. He acted recklessly in jumpinl:> 
onto a car which he claimed was accelerating as it ap-
proached him. Thereafter he flashed the light in the eyes of 
the defendant Jongsma and threatened to kill him. Cer-
tainly, there was no emergency with which this plaintiff 
was confronted. By his own testimony he was fully aware 
of what was going on. The only conclusion is that he 
deliberately and recklessly chose to expose himself to a 
dangerous condition. Under the testimony of the de-
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fendant Jongsma his a<;tion would have been even more 
reckless because he then had to move from a position of 
safety over toward the car and deliberately jump thereon. 
The lower court felt that the plaintiff was not confronted 
with any emergency except that of his own creation, and 
we submit that the evidence so shows. To have 'given the 
instruction under such circumstances would have been 
error. 
POINT VI. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO PERMIT THE 
PLAINTIFF TO CROSS-EXAMINE THE DEFEND-
ANT KAY WITH REFERENCE TO, CERTAIN AL-
LEGED CO,NVERSA TIONS. 
Complaint is made that both Jongsma and Kay testi-
fied that they were frightened and their acts were moti-
vated by fear. The testimony which the plaintiff sought 
to ask the witness, Kay, was to the effect that following 
the accident and when threatened with a complaint by 
Broadhead, Kay allegedly stated that uif a complaint were 
filed he and his gang would wipe the Broadheads out" 
and that when mention was made that he was in a mess, 
he answered: uy es, I am, what are you going to do about 
it, God damn you?" What Kay said could have no bear-
ing on the fear which Jongsma had. Kay was not driving 
the car. Any statement which he made had no bearing on 
any fright which Jongsma might have experienced. Plain-
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tiff further contends that this testimony was admissible 
on the issue of credibility and to refute Kay's testimony 
that he was frightened and scared. Kay did not testify 
with reference to any of the facts in connection with the 
accident. He admitted that he did not see the car start 
up and did not observe its movements thereafter. Whether 
Kay was frightened or not had no bearing on the issues 
in this case and since he had not testified to any of the 
issues in connection with the actual occurrence, to attack 
his credibility on such an insignificant matter which had 
no possible bearing on the case is ridiculous. The only 
purpose of such testimony was to prejudice the jury against 
Kay and Jongsma. It had no bearing on any of the issues 
of the case and was properly rejected. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We strongly submit that all of the evidence in this 
case clearly showed that any action on the part of Jongs-
ma was not wilful or wanton or reckless. Wilfulness had 
been expressly eliminated from the case by the pretrial 
order. There was a sharp conflict in the testimony be-
tween Jongsma and the plaintiff, who were the only wit-
nesses who actually testified to the events leading up to 
the occurrence. The jury did not believe and no one 
could expect it to believe that Jongsma drove into the 
telephone pole in an attempt to get away. The fact that 
he hit the pole clearly bore out his own contention that 
the light was flashing in his eyes, with the gun at his head, 
and that he was so frightened he did not know what he 
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was doing. If his conduct was characterized by the stigma 
of wilful or wanton and had he been able to see where he 
was going, he might have speeded up, but certainly would 
not have driven into a telephone pole and thereby wreck 
the car and expose himself to discovery. The court and the 
jury had the opportunity of seeing and observing all par-
ties to the action, in appraising not only their testimony, 
but their action and demeanor. They simply did not be-
lieve the plaintiff's story and felt that the accident occur-
red in the manner claimed by Jongsma. As indicated by 
this court in the case of Gittens v. Lundberg, 3 Ut. 2d 
392, 284 P. 2d 1115, the jury was in a favored position 
to form impressions as to the trust to be imposed in wit-
nesses, to observe their appearance and general demeanor, 
and to feel the impact of their personalities. As further 
indicated by this court in the case of Heywood v. Denver 
& Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 6 Utah 2d 15 5, 307 
P. 2d 1 04 5, jury verdicts once rendered should not be 
lightly vacated nor interfered with by trial or reviewing 
courts. Instructions must be considered altogether and 
viewed with tolerance and understanding to see whether 
the basic issues were fairly and intelligently presented. 
Where that purpose is accomplished, the verdict should 
not be nullified for any minor error or inconsistencies. We 
submit that the plaintiff has had a full, fair trial, that 
the rna tter was adeq ua tel y covered under the court's in-
structions, and that the jury verdict and judgment entered 
below should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH & STRONG 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Respondents 
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